

SECRET

AIR

SECURITY INFORMATION

MGAA- 426

Chief, SR
Chief, KE
Chief of Station, Frankfurt

18 March 1952

REDSOX/ABQUK

Statement from CAMEISTA 2 on Need for a Military Unit.

Reference: KAUFFG 811

1. Transmitted herewith is a statement handed to [] by CAMEISTA 2 at the same time he discussed the activities of Antonovich (fmu) alias Zaluzhni (fmu) outlined in the reference cable. The statement shows very clearly the strong feeling that CAMEISTA 2 has on the subject. In this connection it should be impressed on all concerned that here is an emigrant leader who has been far more tractable than most and who has always been straightforward in his dealings with our case officers. Above and beyond that, he has produced agent personnel in a constant flow, a fact we cannot afford to overlook.

2. The recommendations contained in the reference cable for the establishment of some sort of military unit as soon as possible still stand, and it is urged that every consideration be given to various ways and means of providing such a unit.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCESMETHODSEXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
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THE SCHOOL PROJECT

The Belorussian political emigration, which found itself in the West as a result of the second World War, has never abandoned the idea of a return to the fatherland, and of the continued struggle to liberate it from the Bolsheviks. The seventh year of expectation is already passing, and the majority have begun to establish themselves in a new life, some with the idea of permanent settlement.

Today the largest numbers of emigrants are in England, the United States, Canada, and Australia. The process of assimilation is proceeding rather rapidly, particularly in the USA, Australia, and Canada. The intense national feeling is beginning gradually to be transformed into a lovely dream, which, however, does not produce people who are ready to make a supreme sacrifice to their native land. If, in 1945, one hundred Belorussian emigrants had been asked which of them were willing to join penetration units, with the possibility of utilizing several units before the beginning of war, there would have been 70 or 80 volunteers. Today only 20 to 25 of the hundred would be ready for the long-range purpose, and not more than one or two for the immediate military aim. This number is decreasing and will continue to decrease as the emigrants become absorbed in the life of the people among whom they live.

People who as late as 1951 would have been ready for anything now refuse to undertake an assignment that involves risk, saying that when an army is organized, then they will fulfill their duty to the fatherland. It is worth noting that one soldier in the rear of the enemy is worth 100 soldiers at the front line.

In this connection I propose the prompt organization of schools for officers and warrant officers, which will accept the best elements among former Belorussian soldiers and youth. At a suitable time they will be dropped into the interior of Belorussia. Among them there will be people who, after sufficient training, will be willing to establish liaison with the homeland during the preparatory period. This school should be organized under the cover of "foreigners in the American army," which will obviate suspicion. The candidates should have the rights of American soldiers. The school will be a Belorussian; the instructors, Belorussian and American specialists. People who have once entered military life, are free from the "brakes" of civilian life. This will form a permanent base from which it could always be possible to man cadre for the work that is now being carried on. Not one person, newly inducted into the army, regardless of his superior qualities, could carry out the assignments that any soldier who has lived a sufficient length of time in military barracks and undergone training and who is psychologically prepared would be able to do.

The program of such a school would represent a special plan. Aside from military subjects, there should be political, propaganda, organizational, and administrative instruction. The course of study should be for one or

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two years. The further fate of such a group would be entirely dependent on the general situation. If there is no further question of war, the group would be demobilized and transferred to civilian work in the USA.

Such an undertaking is indispensable to the successful and effective conduct of today's work. Practice has shown that the accidental selection of candidates does not produce satisfactory results. Furthermore, the number of such candidates is becoming depleted and the work may be brought to a stand-still for lack of people.

Those who go today should go with the assurance that they are only the vanguard of an already organized group. But the promise that only in the event of war will such a group be organized will evoke doubt about the seriousness of this work, for each one knows that to organize such a group at short notice is very difficult, if not impossible.

Today the organization of such a group as I have proposed has been undertaken with the full support of one of the western governments. In this connection, I make this warning, that if we do not succeed in doing this in time, not one person will be left to us.

At the beginning of our working together, the principal condition was the organization of such a school, for at that time I already foresaw the difficulties which we are now facing. There was agreement in principle, and the organization of the school was contemplated for the beginning of March. I shall not retreat from this position in the future. If one side fails to carry out its obligations, the second is automatically released from its obligations.

If the local establishment is not able to decide this question, I request that you put me into contact with those persons on whom the decision of the problem depends.

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